Emel Öztürk

Lecturer · Department of Economics · Tilburg University

Equality of opportunity
Fair division
Cooperative game theory, in particular applications to environmental problems
Dynamics of discrimination


1. Laissez-faire versus Pareto (with K. Bosmans )
Social Choice and Welfare

2. Equality and responsibility: ex ante and ex post redistribution mechanisms, 2021 (with K. Bosmans)
Economic Theory

3. Measurement of equality of opportunity: A normative approach, 2021 (with K. Bosmans)
Journal of Economic Inequality

4. Fair social orderings for the sharing of international rivers: A leximin based approach, 2020
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

5. Consistency of scoring rules: A reinvestigation of composition-consistency, 2020
International Journal of Game Theory

6. An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy, 2018 (with K. Bosmans)
Social Choice and Welfare

Ongoing Research

1. Characterization and implementation of an egalitarian solution for the sharing of international rivers [Ongoing]

2. Failure to compensate or failure to reward? A decomposition of inequality of opportunity, 2019 (with K. Bosmans & B. Dormans)[Ongoing]
Abstract We decompose inequality of opportunity measures into compensation and reward components. The former component measures the unfair inequality due to circumstances and the latter component measures the deviation from the fair inequality stemming from the exercise of responsibility. We then apply a selection of these measures, and their associated decomposition, to data covering ten European countries.

3. Non-cooperative foundations of three solutions for cycle-free graph games [Ongoing]
Abstract We study implementation in the context of cycle-free graph games. We propose three mechanisms whose equilibrium payoffs coincide with the Myerson value, the average tree solution and the position value, respectively. These mechanisms operate in two stages. In the ffrst stage, a player is chosen to be the proposer. The proposer offers payments to all other players. If the offer is accepted, the game ends. If the offer is rejected, the game continues to the second stage in which all players play a new game. The three mechanisms differ in terms of how a proposer is chosen in the second stage, and what happens when an offer is rejected. In addition to implementing the three solutions, the mechanisms highlight important differences between the solutions.

4. A simple mechanism to implement the Shapley value [Ongoing]
Abstract We study the implementation of the Shapley value in the context of cooperative games with zero-monotonic value functions. We propose a non-cooperative game whose equilibrium outcome coincides with the vector of Shapley value payo s. We extend our results to implement weighted Shapley values. Finally, we provide a generalization of our game to implement the Shapley value for cooperative games with non-monotonic value functions. Our non-cooperative game is inspired by the bargaining procedure of Hart and Mas-Colell [(1996). Bargaining and value. Econometrica 64(2), 357-380] and the bidding mechanism of Perez-Castrillo andWettstein [(2001). Bidding for the surplus: a noncooperative approach to the Shapley value. Journal of Economic Theory, 100 (2), 274-294].

5. Sharing the costs of pollution (with K. Bosmans)[Ongoing]
Abstract We study rules that distribute the costs of pollution among polluters. The rules we propose take into account differences in the transmission of pollutants across locations.